Introduction
Anyone who has followed the conflict resolution literature over the past forty to fifty years cannot help but notice that certain themes wax and wane. The constellation of ideas that have emerged as part of the contemporary burgeoning conflict resolution industry has a history In the late 1950s intellectual trends developed in reaction to equilibrium theorists who romanticised consensual and harmonious models or who saw a silver lining in every conflict. There were two opposing schools of thought. In British anthropology the Manchester school led by Max Gluckman (1959) represented the idea that social conflict was functional for the maintenance of social systems. In the United States anthropologists Bernard Siegal and Alan Beals (1960) In 1968 Ralf Dahrendorf extended the earlier work arguing that social conflict is a creative force. In his words: 'Not the presence but the absence of conflict is surprising and abnormal ... we must never lose sight of the underlying assumption that conflict can be temporarily suppressed, regulated, channeled, and controlled, but that neither a philosopher-king nor a modern dictator can abolish it once and for all' (Dahrendorf 1968:127) .
Nevertheless, by the 1970s the dialogue over conflict was shifting once again. In the United
States public policy was led by the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, Warren Burger. The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) explosion burst onto the scene and was institutionalised (Nader 1989) . Conflict, as epitomised by the adversarial system, was now portrayed as uncivilised, lawyers were pictured as hired guns, peace not conflict was the goal, harmony not contentious behaviour was extolled. ADR, a response to containing the rights movements of the 1960s, was (among other things) a movement institutionalised at the national level and then exported. By the 1990s, ADR had become a major industry composed of professionals from a wide variety of fields: law, economics, psycholog) political science, peace and conflict, therapy groups and religious movements. In spite of early success, the movement was always more attractive to professionals than to its potential consumers, who here and abroad remain generally sceptical about the philosophy and purpose of ADR. By 1996 those interested in alternative conflict resolution had bifurcated into scholars and practitioners, with the latter being in the greatest number.
In Africanist scholarship the trends have followed in much the same direction. The ethnographic and social anthropological schools of structural functionalism contributed an enormous body of scholarship about traditional African societies. For many anthropologists, traditionalism was good or functional and modernism (Westernisation) was disruptive. Today some refer to the work of the colonial period as having been written in the 'noble savage' tradition, noting that anthropologists in their protectionist attitudes had sought to preserve African cultures, which ipso facto commits them to preserving the status quo. Although there were exceptions, the structural functionalist orientation laid emphasis on equilibrium, integration, harmony and consensus. African societies were, however, often neither integrated nor harmonious, either in the precolonial days (where they were often embroiled in militaiy conquests), or in the colonial period, which was characterised by economic, political, and racial conflicts.
Anthropologists often portrayed the peoples they studied as if they were culturally homogenous, speaking about peoples without adequate attention to the wide degree of structural variation and cultural pluralism. That is, they essentialïsed. Still, anthropologists were also among the first to criticise their early work, and often in the lead with With these historical highlights in mind the present interdisciplinary scholarship can be seen to be of a more partial sort. Ethnographically rich descriptions of conflict resolution in situ have given way to description of conflict resolution techniques, work that comes closer to a shreds-and-patches style of reporting. Today, the bias of scholarship is narrower, more practical, and more specialised. In addition, interdisciplinary searches for recipes for peace stem from political considerations that are bipartisan, nationalist, pan-African, religious or internationalist.
If colonialism was basically ignored as part of the anthropological work a half century ago, today neocolonialism and globalisation are also inadequately incorporated in Africanist scholarship on conflict resolution even though development is sometimes linked with alternative dispute resolution. But the reflexivity that developed as a result of the selfcritiques of the sixties and earlier also means that now we can use our critical sense to examine scholarship, ours and others, Euroamerican and African, with attention to such mundane questions as whose funding, whose questions, whose benefits. We can also question whether disciplinary concepts have contributed to 'ethnographic error' and inadequate scholarship. In what follows I talk about what mostly is not talked about in relation to dispute resolution in 'modern', the problem with thinking about dispute resolution in terms of mechanisms or techniques that are specialities, the ingenuousness of speaking about conflict resolution without speaking to and about power, without speaking about arms dealing, its source and its distribution,1 without speaking about multinationals and resource competition -to at least round out the picture of 'internal' dissensions in Africa that are thinly portrayed on the media's front burner.
There is a tendency to write and speak about conflict resolution without mention of root causes, or to contrast customary with state law without adequate mention of European implants, without thought to the consequences of short-term objectives versus long-term solutions to problems.
Underlying much of this writing has been an avoidance of the hegemonies that ride on law or alternative dispute techniques, in order to introduce yet another reason for future conflicts. There is also avoidance of the ideological basis of conflict management paradigms. Christianity spread the harmony legal model in a manner that resembles the modern ADR movement -with its emphasis on compromise and consensus as a preferred way of decision making, peace over justice being a mandatory result (Nader 1990 Rose (1996) addresses some of the conceptual problems of reinvented tradition by comparing contemporary American ADR with conflict resolution in African communities. She points out that modern mediators are formally trained, are strangers to the disputants, are expected to be neutral, are private, formal, and structured. African communities use mediators with informal training through 'life experience', are insiders and known to the disputants, not expected to be neutral, operate collectively within a council of elders in a public setting. While the American ADR specialists operate with a limited range of relevancy, the African process is characterised by a wide range of relevancy, with full communication and public disclosure. Consensus between the parties is not what is sought, rather they want an outcome which satisfies the community, usually placing community interests before the disputants' personal interests.
Tradition and Power
Under the auspices of the US AID programme, Rose visited post-war Rwanda in 1994 to conduct research into the local justice system (customary institutions known as the gacaca) as preparation for a larger ADR research team. The long-term goal was a programme aimed at a Rwandan ADR initiative to train mediators in the (temporary) absence of courts. Rose found that the gacaca survived the war, that people were seldom without operational gacaca, and that they adapted to circumstances of refugee camps or other temporary or permanent circumstances. Rose also noted that the gacaca took on wider functions beyond dispute resolution such as the resettlement of large numbers of displaced persons. Those gacaca implicated in war-related events suffered a loss of legitimacy; nevertheless Rose makes the point that Rwanda's 'customary institution' had risen to the challenge of their warravaged country and an ADR initiative, even should they make use of traditional institutions like the gacaca, would serve to weaken local selfmanagement or customary law.
Rose is referring to the cultural baggage that travels with American ADR, even when or especially when it is tied to a restructuring of indigenous systems. Tradition and power is what she is addressing, and an ADR American style that has much the flavour of earlier missionising efforts of religious evangelising.
The other side of the coin appears when local peoples desire to keep control by means of customary proceedings in the light of external powers against whom they may be complaining. This is a condition where strong national law with international appeal capacities cannot be substituted for by localised forums such as the ADR.
The Power Dimension
If there is any single generalisation that has ensued from the anthropological research on disputing processes (Nader and Todd 1978) Ury (1990) declares that the Bushman of the Kalahari 'may have been more peaceful than we who call ourselves "civilised". In a concluding comment he articulates an imaginary purity devoid of the power dimension:
The Bushman of the Kalahari are a truly interdependent society: they are socialised from birth to be acutely aware of and sensitive to one another needs ... In these peopl&s lives -and presumably in our ancestors' lives as wellcooperation more than competition becomes the order of the day In our modern economies, based as they are on competition among individuals and groups, it is easy to see the human adventure as a struggle for survival in which you must win at all costs at the expense of others. Our way of life is a few centuries old; the Bushman has lasted tens of millennia. Life may in fact be about the 'survival of the fittest', but what makes people truly 'fit', as the Bushmen remind us, is their ability to cooperate and to settle disruptive disputes. (Fuller 1978:368-69 ), yet only a few international water disputes have been settled by adjudication. Before Fuller's article appeared, two international law specialists argued his same point specifically in reference to international river disputes (Laylin and Bianchi 1959) -that without the possibility of third-party decision makers, the more powerful disputant can use ADR negotiation to greater advantage.
A review of the role of adjudication and negotiation in international river disputes (the Ganges, Jordan, Colorado, Duoro, and Danube rivers) characterised by power asymmetry and upstreamdownstream issues reveals preference by the less powerful nations for World Court adjudication while the more powerful countries prefer negotiation (Nader 1994) . It is reasonable in this light to understand why, for powerful parties, negotiation and ADR are preferred over the International Court of Justice.
The US joined the Court in 1946 after congressional debates over whether national sovereignty would be threatened. Since 1946 there have been changes in the Court's composition and in the types of cases it considers. In 1946 two-thirds of the judges were either Americans or West Europeans. With the addition of over one hundred states, many of them 'third world' states, judges reflect changed composition; newer judges may be sympathetic to the causes of the newer nations. Indeed, this change was reflected in a number of decisions which ruled in favour of third world nation plaintiffs such as in 23 the case of Nicaragua against the US in 1984. In 1985, the Reagan administration withdrew the US 1946 agreement to voluntarily comply with the jurisdiction of the World Court. As I put it: 'The Soviet Union in the mid-i 960s and the US in the mid-980s ... both withheld dues, thereby abdicating their financial responsibility and evincing a mood of indifference to international law' (Nader 1994: 44) . There has been a gradual divergence between the Court's decisions and the national interests of the developed countries. Interestingly, the trivialisation of international adjudication came at the height of the ADR explosion in the US and national attacks on Nor can dispute resolution replace the rule of law in a country like Mozambique, which in 1992 agreed to a settlement that put an end to war. But peace did not bring prosperity; it brought poverty, which some say was caused by IMF-imposed stabilisation policies (Hanlon 1996) . Some Mozambicans call this economic colonialism, different from earlier colonialism because it does not have a face. In faceto-faceless conflict the indigenous paradigm of faceto-face dispute resolution has no place. On the contrary, 'In trade negotiations, dispute resolution proceedings are conducted in complete secrecy with all documents unavailable to the public except through leaks to the press' (French 1993).
One last aspect of power dimensions in Africa has to do with military power, which is not commonly reported in academic writings on conflict management. The topic was highlighted in an issue of Harpers Magazine in a piece titled 'An army of one's own -in Africa, nations hire a corporation to wage war' (Rubio 1997). The author writes about a corporation that provides clandestine warfare, combat air patrol, battle handling and sniper training. The company -Executive Outcomes -in exchange for $15 million and a share of Sierra Leone's diamond mines was able to do what no one else had been able to do: 'No one -not the United Nations, not the Organisation of African Unity, not the international-conflict-resolution experts who filled up the abandoned tourist hotels in Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital -was able to bring the fighting under control' (ibid: 45). According to Ruhm, Executive Outcomes was to 'combat and destroy the "terrorist enemies of the state"; to restore internal security; and to help build and maintain an economic climate where new investment could be attracted and allowed ro flourish' (ibid), Sierra Leone, long viewed as a disaster, became for a short while a West African 'success', so much so that the mercenaries became respected heroes because they had replaced banditry with security Such occurrences are more than a shift in the nature of war, they indicate a shift in the nature of law. As in the premodern period, military and economic functions will be reunited by means of the booming security business, which in the case of Sierra Leone and other African countries is taking over the state, or at least recolonising, with private armies clearing the way for business firmsthe 'privatisation of violence'. 
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ADR specialists have defined their domain in too limited a frame. They need to enlarge the scope. And when they do they will also realise that it is not possible to have a universal paradigm for conflict management. One of the cleverest propaganda concepts invented after colonialism, whether consciously or not, was the term 'post-colonial'. It is, as with 'tradition', a concept up for grabs.
When we say traditional was followed by colonial and that was followed by post-colonial, it appears as if discontinuities prevailed over continuities.
Yet, if we look at the factors presently destabilising the world at an accelerated rate, we find many of the same economic interests that fuelled the colonial regimes still in the lead. This article is not the place to review the sources of destabilisations, yet specialists in dispute resolution would be able to develop more realistic frames for specific disputes or conflicts if they understood the message of increasing numbers of businessmen who are speaking about and writing about globalisation and desrabilisation by means of such activities as global free trade, intensive agriculture, energy policies, management's bottom line or market-place ideology (Karten 1996; Goldsmith 1994; Estes 1996; Soros 1997 ).
The Power of Ideology
The process whereby ideologies that are forces of change are shaped in modern nation states goes beyond the law to include the links between law, business, and community constituencies. However, the principal vehicle for the transmission of ideological forces has been and continues to be by means of law state or international law in the contemporary period, for good or for bad.
Historian Jerold Auerbach (1983) 'Amid the social dislocations that accompanied the rapid concentration of wealth and power in the age of industrial expansion, the full force of law was asserted to protect the new social order' (Auerbach 1983:139-40) . Auerbach continues to note that competing pockets of authority originating in tribalism, religion, ethnicity and class were stripped of dispute settlement processes that had contributed to internal cohesion, but that now competed with the legal supremacy of the state. He explains the current enthusiasm for delegalisation as an effort to deal with the legitimacy dilemma: the law is designed to protect the Haves as well as the HaveNots. The problem is that the ideal of equal justice is incompatible with the social realities of unequal power so that, as 1 have said elsewhere, disputing without the force of law is doomed to failure (Nader 1979) .
Other scholars during the early 1980s iterated the same line of criticism and elaborated the problems with ADR (Abel 1982; Harrington 1985; Hofrichter 1987) . Nevertheless ADR marched on to become institutionalised and internationalised, despite continued critiques that more recently stress the irreconcilablity between problem-solving mediation and transformative mediation (Milrier 1996; Bush and Baruch 1996) . Scholars have by now documented the ills of problem-solving alternatives that do not address social justice issues, since the core feature of most alternative processes is that they address and resolve individual cases on individuated criteria. Some, like Sally Merry (1993), unselfconsciously argue that 'popular justice introduces a new ideology of conflict resolution based on nonviolence and opposition to the violence of law ' (Merry and Mimer 1993:62). Others think that one can tinker with present alternatives to make them more responsive actors in issues of social transformation.
While scholars meditate on the possibilities of popular justice, the real consequences of ADR policies are harsh. The most hard-hitting critique of American ADR is that of the late Trina Grillo (1991) , a law professor and mediator, who understood better than most the ideological nature of ADR mediation in family cases, and the ADR process dangers for women. Grillo points revolve around the notions that mandatory mediation abridges freedom because it is often outside the law, eliminates choice of procedure, removes equal protection before an adversary law and is generally hidden from view In spite of growing awareness of its consequences, ADR ideology is intact and diffusing worldwide.
There is more to American ADR ideology than the obvious congruencies between trade ideology and harmony ideology (i.e. harmonising), or even the 25 missionising and pacification of indigenous peoples. There is in American culture such a yearning for an idealised equality that the very ideology of equality creates a denial of unequal power. This in itself inspires the 'soldiers' of movements like ADR, those that make it happen: the experts, the practitioners, even the scholars who feed the narrative. But try to imagine what happens when the 'soldiers' of a movement like ADR go abroad with such ideological baggage to deal with different sets of legal ideologies amongst different people with different histories.
Discussion
To move forward we need epistemological models that allow us to understand the interaction of law, power, and tradition (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1992), 'true' or invented, and accompanying ideologies that characterise social conflict. No matter how autonomous we may wish the dispute resolution process to be, it is not autonomous. It is completely intermingled with political and economic issues. When policies are being engineered from Western or Westernised ideas, the impact of Western notions of autonomous systems and the importance of individual (rather than that of collective-centred perspectives) cannot be forgotten.
Clearly any ADR scheme needs careful study of the social conditions in which it may operate. The rhetoric of harmony law models is attractive. But the idea that in a conciliatory model people do not fight but rather harmoniously agree about a common solution is fiction. So also is the belief that such a harmony model exists ïn 'primitive' and idyllic societies. Once again we need to understand the real dynamic of power that is at play In another context, Nader and Shugart (1980) concluded that practitioners of dispute management need to think in terms of a complaint chain, one that moves from negotiation to mediation, to arbitration and adjudication, in a chain of referrals in which the least powerful gain as they move up the chain, thus giving incentive for parties to move towards an outcome. 'Disputing without the force of law' (Nader 1979) will not work unless the force of law is available as a last resort. lt is not possible to divorce law and power. The underside of conflict management includes more than a study of techniques of conflict resolution. It includes nationalism and its consequences and its actors -politicians, businessmen, arms dealers, mercenaries, ethnics and above all victims. We know that the causes of war and conflict are not necessarily endemic. An integrated perspective on policy directions for conflict management in the face of more grounded contexts will undoubtedly favour constraint over consensus, and law over lawlessness.
Notes
For an excellent discussion of arms dealing and the African continent see Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, edited by Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura Reed, 
